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CU:~A

CRISIS

Speec:. of Senator M.ke L:.. . nsfield (D. ~·:ont . )

\~e

ere noH il the third ucek of debate on the Bricker aiJendn:e1.t ,

c. week dudng w:.ich tl.e

~solution

will be discussed but not voted on.

\:e will cont::.nue i •.to -:.not her \leek a 1d, perr.aps ::t::..ll ur.other.

I

recog:1iz.a t:JD.t the que:· t.ion is one of great irnportanc.:e wd I ao not in
any way r.cun to deprecate the Semte 1s concern in this IllD.tter.
cannot believe tr.at it is of such ur5ency tr.at we Ol.ltibt to
other vital issues \Hri.ch are prcssL1e in on the nation .

But I

r.e~;lect

After all,

the treaty- TIIC.king pO\.JCr in its present fox-m }'1-as served the United
Stctes for lbO odd years .
betlr

~.ith

I trust , tl'ercfore, that the Senate will

n:e in a brief disc"Js::don of anotl:or vit.al issue .

I would not do so unless I felt tlnt the rcutter
abou1.

1.0

~·

nich I am

c::.scuss requires tr.e urgent attention of the .::>enate .

Last September, I travelled ::>evero.l tbonsand rr.ilcs in tl!e three
states of Indo-Chir.a..

'1' •.e

relatively quiet phase.

\Ii.lr

tlu:.t j_s t;oing on there was then in a

The to\lns and cities c.ppcared peaceful and

there \.:as a not.e of optilri.sl'l, a uope th.".t perrP.ps the French und the
Associated States of Laos , Cambodia, and VietliDm were going to win
out over tr.e Coir.I:Ul1ists and Lold this vital

territor~'

in tLe camp of

free nations .
t:o the situatior. hcs suddenly cl:anged.

The ne.,.,s of the

change is on the i nside pages of tle press but, in many respects ,
it overs:JS.dO\:s ir1 importance to the nution tt.e headlines which llill
soon be forgotten.

B1·ief notes , a few parugra.phs here and there ,

tell of t •.e SHiftly developir.g crisis in Indo-China.
observed, this crisis

~ght

If not closely

eusily resolve itself i nto a Communist

victory m· tLe entanglenent of the United States in anotl.cr Korean
situation.

- 2 The

Co::::urnmis~-:'..cd

offensive into

northe~n

Vietminh forces h&·.re oper:ed up a n,w
Laos

~~d

ere coving

of t!:e ro) ul car.',tal of tu{• "ig Prabang.
'l,h~own

probc.bly

The

rcpi~· L~

Vi~~iti:1."1

d~rection

the

co ·.mand 1-:as

::.t :!.eect a oivision and possibly more i<1to nort.hm.·n

Laos lind has twc PC:dLlvrt.£':!. c:visjo ...s 0:1 tho Viet:.lRm'=··!..c.os boraer ..
The saric,usness

o:

the

r.itu·..:.~:rm

is showtl by the ne...-.3

b~.ac'Y.cu.~

i.mr.osed

on February J by the Fr·c'lch high cou::nand on information fror.t nortl ern
Laos .
Of grave cc ....cern is the effect of t!"ese victories cf ao Chiminh 1s forces on Peri:·?
Americans in
dro.win~

if

t~z

th~

The French mood parallels that of some

grim winter

from nort 11 Kor ~av

c~

~:~~l'lY

1950 when

ou~

f orces were with-

vish to ao'l"'1don Indo- G~i na ~

French qn::.t the struGt:o the gatevay of

S::-~'.th

/mel

Jl:;.ia is open

to the on\o. ,·cd march of Commun.i.st ireperia:isn.
Des01 ting Vietnam troot:::.. have cost additional vital outposts in southern

Vietn~

as t!".e Colllr.lunist invaders of northern

Laos sveep onvard and Red Forces harass positions elsevhere in
Indo- China.

Approximately 40 nilitar y posts in Cochin- China have been seized

by Communist- led rebels during the last tvo
fell

th~ough

treason or desertion.

veeks~

At least half

Vietnamese troops have gone

over to the Vietminh , evidently vi thout a struggle and of their own
volition .

This may indicate the success vhich Communist- leader Ho

Chi- minh has had in personifying

himself as a leader of anticolonial

and antivestern nationalism instead of vhat he actually is -- the
leader of the Com:nunist forces against France and the Associated
States.

- 3-In n:y rcpvrt on In:l-:>·Gbir.u to the Connn1"ttee on For.,..ign
Relations on Oc'Lobr 2'7) 1953, I pointed out that one of the
n:cst i:1port J.."lt
lies in the
t.nists.

el~;::::l.mt.s

1·.nbi!..Jz r-.tio~!

in a f-Ut:>cessful ten.'.:.1ction of l.o.s tn:. ties
of t!-.n loc'll p3c-ple c:..ca:.n'3t the Gor.:m-

At tho S..:llt<) tine I stated that a substantial pc.rt of

the population , at present indifferent, would , if success is
to be c.chieved , have to enter into a.ctive participation on the
non-,communi·;t sido.

Faihre to utilize the po\Ter latent in

nationalism <::srves n:erely to increase the cost to o'.rselves
end to Frc.n1.c of :p::.·aV'cnt::..!g the Connn"tmists from s:;n.zing IndoC::ina .

'Tl-i.'l

!~.:ts

ooen err;/'1::tSized by ti ·e sta:.sment <•£' l.o .._oident

2benh0\Jer at a ne\TS cor.farence on vTcdnesd.;.y, Feb:ruary 3, in
t-Jfiich l.e stated th:J.t:
:'t'!vcryoP'-l knc: ·s that the r.eart 'l."ld sou:!. of the populatior usual~y becr~r.es the bigccst factor of st..ccess
or failure in a si tn3.t-: on such as Indo-China. 11
The President further observed that if the Vietnamese
wanted to be free; if they believed that through this kind of
war they will be free , there probably uill te a success in
that area .
'!'he only

t~ay

to innure success in the struggle ae;ainst

Communism in Indo- China is for the people of the Associated
States to put their shoulders to tre wheel.

They must stop the

squabbling .,.rhich has been goinr on between the mnnerous religious
and political t,roups in the area c.nd recognize the fact that
whether or not they t-till ac: icve independence promised
them by the French, us a m:1tter of their oun choosing and,

- 4in large
r

p~·

1

· h~ir

cwn resp=r.s·uility .

r.e sj -:.uaticn hos

t,lread:~

deteriorated during tl:e l'ast

few weeks 1 so muc:. oo t:1nt the French Govel'!'l.."!lcnt has asked
thP. A""9ric:::..'l
anc'

plane~

Covd-~.:'li-'1~

to

s.:-~C.

additional knericl:.• tee! niciar:s

t.0 the ·:ndo- "'1:ina tl.eater.

:Th::.:e consiceri11g and

acceding to these :-equests we should look at the mi.:!.itary situation in Indo Chir.a.
The

Fr~~ch

nave in excess of 400 1 000 troops of various

kinds in t:ns tr.catre of war .

They :1re led by extremely

capable off,cers in the persons of Generals Navarre , Bodet
~'1d

Co['ny.

diplorr.ctic

The r.-ench .. :1ve also pt:.t cne of their ablest
~ffici.lls ,

1;.,_\..irice de Jean , in:.u the

Cor. mJ ';sioner for Indo- China .

c-~f.:.ce

of High

The Cor.li!lunis t forc<:>z , leud by

Ho Ci1' - minh, are cstima'Jed to number appro:·:!.ootely 300, 000 men .
I n addition t o the n'.unerical

suprior~ ty

of the French

and the Associated States , t'b.cse forces have in general , sufficient military supplies , with which to carry on the war .

I

was told that rt:\P eatedly by both American and French officials
during my study mission to Vietnam, Laos , and Cambodia and
recent information substantiates this fact .

The only items

which are cited by French authorities in the area as being
in short supply are helicopters and small naval craft for
use in the delta areas .

These shortaces are being filled by

additional shipments from the United States . A request of
25 C- 47 transports was sent to L"'ldo- China in December of last

- 5yea:r .

The French have been receiving a steady flow of A.'11erican aid

and in January the 400th ship carrying American assistance to IncloChina arrived at Haiphonc , en add:i tional 50 shipnen+s since P.ugust ,
1953 .

These shipments have included ammunition , transports and combat

-ehicles , military air craft, navy vessels , communication

equi p~cnt ,

small arms and automatic weapons, ar tillery , ammunition , hospital supplies ,
engineerin~

and other technical equipment.

In rry repor t to the Foreign Relations Corm:ittee I stated

~hat

"without a vast increase in striking power the Vietminh will not be
defeated .

This increaGe , primarily c question of mar.pcw:r, cannot come

from France already hard- pressed to meet com.":li tments elsel-rhere.
certainly can not come from this country.

It

It can come only from the three

Indo- Chinese States . "
11

And it is right that it should come from the.'l.

freedom and national existence is at stake.

'1l.eir

hope for

If they have the will to

s ustain themselves as independent nations, the French have pledged
themselves to continue to support them until the Communists are defeated.
As for the material needed to insure the resistal'lce , we have not stinted
in our assistance in the pest a11d we are not likely to do so in t:.e future . 11
And the State which can make the crea test contribtltion by far,
if it will forget its internal squabbling and shoulder the responsibilities it must if it is to become and rcr..ain independent , is the
State of Vietnam.
today they have 13 .

The Laotians had in October, 1953, one battalion,
The Cambodians l:ad approximately 10 bet tal ions.

- 6The Vietnamese had

so~ething

like SO

b~ttalionG

in teinc and with plans

c3llinG for a force witLin a few years on the order of 200 onttclions.
It

w~s

the hope of the French

it

co~d

that

Co~d

an area

~5

bec~e

pacified

be turned over, militarily and administratively to the

Vietnamese troops and the Vietnam Govern.'llent .

Some decree of success

has been achieved in this policy but one Honders hO\.,

lon~

it \.fill take

if desertions like those wi"ich occurred in South Vietnrun continue .
The pacification of hostile areas in
and is not yet -- a

serio~ proble~

c~mhodi~

and Laos has not been

teca.se the Vietminh forces have teen

operating largely in Vietnam.
It is my understanding t!'":at PresiC:ent E.:.senhower has appointed a
Committee to report to the :Jational Sect:ri ty
Indo- China.

co~~c '1

on the proLle:n of

It is my further understandi!'lg tLat tl e President

h~s

authorized an additional shipment of B 26 bombers for the Indo- China
theater .

According to press reports France has asked for 400 l'nited

States technicians to help service these and other planes and to train
French and Vietnamese technicians .

Over the \.Jeek- end the press has

carried stories to the effect that 200 Air Force ground technicians
have been sent to Indo- China.

I might say that on tre basis of ny

Knowledre of the situation in Indo- China tre 0uestion of
of air craft by

.~erican perso~~el h~s

~aintenance

been one cf the projects of the

Hilitary Advisory Assistance Group over t'1e past several mo!'lths .

This

addition , therefore , is a logical exte1.sion of a practice already

underwa~·.

The situation in Indo- C!1ina is

ever- ~l.creasingly ,

a •:orld problem

-7and ans•,rers must be found for the questions
eastern Asia crisis .

arisin~

out of this South-

Before He commit ourselves more deeply in this

area, the Senate and the American people are entitled to knou these
ar.swers.
If we are about to be drat-m reore deeply into the military situation
on the Asia mainland , as some people seem to fear and as some press
reporters hint at , has the Administration undertaken at this point to
replace our conventional forces and plo.ce reliance on atomic weapons?
One need not be a military strategist to know that the kind of t-rars being
fought in

f~ia

are larcely rifle wars , r.ot

ato~ic

wars.

Does the sending of technicians to Indo-China mean that additional
American military personnel will be sent to that area?
Does

it mean that if the French and Associated States forces

become harder-pressed we will send in naval and air support?
Does

it mean that if the situation warrants it, American combat

troops Hill be sent to Indo- China?
Does it mean that action has been or will be taken without notifying
the proper committees of Congress as to just what kind of a policy He
intend to pursue in that area?
He cannot afford to permit the situation in Indo-C!1:ina to drii't any
longer.

A fe,.,. months ago I said on my return from that area that the

issue there could be met successfully by a three- pronged effort of the
Indo- Chinese , the French and the United States .

I reported then that

each had a part to play : Ours , to supply the essential equipment and

--e-material -- which we have; the ;wsociated States ,

pri~~ily

t he

Vietnamese and Cambodian nationalists , to develop t!.e Hill to freedo:r:1
aiJlOng the people and the determination i o fight for it -- '.Thich is
open to serious question; the French, to assist in the achiovencnt of
that f r eedom by a combined mi litar; and political eff ort in keepinc
'..fith thei r finest traditions -- Hhich they have done.
0 0 0

